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CONFLICT OF LAWS-1956 TENNESSEE SURVEY
JOHN W. WADE*
JURISDICTION OF COURTS
Personal Jurisdiction: In State v. Perry,1 the Tennessee Department
of Public Welfare, which had paid sums for the support of dependents
of certain nonresidents, brought an action against the nonresidents
for reimbursement and for an order to pay money in the future. No
personal service was had on the defendants, and the court held that
the Tennessee statute does not authorize the court "to enter a personal
judgment against a non-resident husband-father upon the ex parte
petition, when that husband-father is not personally before the Court,
and afforded no opportunity to be heard. '2 It correctly implied that
such a proceeding would be unconstitutional.
3
The usual method of acquiring jurisdiction over a person is by
service of process on him in the state. The nonresident-motorist cases,
however, are not explainable on this basis. The currently accepted
explanation of these cases is that the doing of an act within the
state causing injury is sufficient to give jurisdiction over the motor-
ist and that the provisions of the nonresident-motorist statutes are
to meet the procedural requirements of due process.4 Two cases in-
volved construction of the Tennessee nonresident-motorist statute.5
Bertrand v. Wilds6 holds that the statute "applies to the operation of
motor vehicles upon public highways by nonresidents and also to
the operation of such vehicles on private property, as a necessary
incident to public travel upon the streets and highways of this
State, ' 7 An accident on a driveway on the grounds of the Veterans
Hospital in Memphis therefore came within the statute. In Oliver
v. Altsheler8 the provision that the Secretary of State can accept
service for one year was held not to be affected by the general statute
giving a plaintiff an additional period of a year to bring suit after a
judgment is entered against him "not concluding his right of action."9
*Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 280 S.W.2d 919 (Tenn. 1955).
2. Id. at 921.
3. Compare Barger v. State, 280 S.W.2d 911 (Tenn. 1955), holding that an
order might constitutionally be issued to a person not to leave the state
without complying with a court order to support a child. See Brockelbank,
Multiple-State Enforcement of Family Support, 2 ST. Louis U.L.J. 12 (1952);
Paulsen, Support Rights and Duties between Husband and Wife, 9 VAND. L. REv.
709 (1956).
4. See generally, GOODICH, CONF CT OF LAWS §§ 72-73 (3d ed. 1949).
5. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-224 to -228 (1956).
6. 281 S.W.2d 390 (Tenn. 1955).
7. Id. at 396.
8. 278 S.W.2d 675 (Tenn. 1955).
9. TENN. CODE ANw. § 28-106 (1956). This holding is in accord with the
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Divorce Jurisdiction: In order for a court to have jurisdiction to
hear an action for divorce at least one of the parties must be domiciled
in the state. In Bowdon v. Bowdon, 0 where the parties misrepresented
the fact that they were nonresidents, criminal contempt proceedings
were held appropriate.
Custody Proceedings: In Alexander v. Alexander," a husband
and wife, originally from Tennessee, had lived in Michigan for some
years. The husband brought an action for divorce in Michigan. The
wife filed a cross bill and sought custody of the child. The husband
returned to Tennessee. While the wife was temporarily visiting in
the state, he seized the child and placed her with his parents. This
bill was by the husband's parents to prevent both parties from inter-
fering with the child. In the meantime the Michigan court had
granted a divorce to the wife, awarding her custody of the child.
The Tennessee court held that the Michigan decree would be con-
trolling. Since the husband had sought the jurisdiction of Michigan
court he could not contest it now. The child's domicile was there-
fore still in Michigan and there was no indication of change of cir-
cumstances. The decision can be based either on the ground that the
Tennessee court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case or on the
ground that it should not exercise jurisdiction under these facts.
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN CAUSE OF AcTION
Wrongful Death: An action was brought under the Kentucky
wrongful death statute in Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Baese
12
in the federal district court for Tennessee. The question was whether
the Kentucky administrator could bring the action. The usual con-
flict of laws rule is that an administrator has no standing outside
the jurisdiction that appointed him and cannot bring a suit in another
state. But when the administrator holds the proceeds as a special fund
for specifically named beneficiaries, he is usually treated as if he were
a "trustee" and permitted to bring the suit without qualifying locally.
13
The Kentucky statute was found in the Baese case to be of this nature;
and the only obstruction to an action by the Kentucky administrator
was the 1955 Tennessee statute providing that no nonresident "shall
be appointed or allowed to qualify or act as personal representative"
unless a resident is appointed to serve with him.14 The court de-
termined that this provision was not applicable when the foreign
administrator was not acting for the general estate and local creditors
earlier case of Tabor v. Mason Dixon Lines, Inc., 196 Tenn. 198, 264 S.W.2d
821 (1953).
10. 278 S.W.2d 670 (Tenn. 1955).
11. 286 S.W.2d 104 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).
12. 136 F. Supp. 683 (M.D. Tenn. 1955).
13. See GooDnicH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 104 (3d ed. 1949).
14. TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-119 (Supp. 1956).
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could have no claim. "To require him in that event to qualify and to
obtain the appointment of a local personal representative would be
at most an idle ceremony of no benefit to Tennessee citizens or creditors
and an undue hardship upon the beneficiaries of the recovery."15
The holding is a desirable one.
Defamation: In Insurance Research Service, Inc. v. Associates Fi-
nance Corp.,16 defendant sent an allegedly defamatory letter from
Tennessee to plaintiff in Missouri. On the issue of publication as an
element of a cause of action in libel Missouri law governed. The
court found that the decisions of the intermediate appellate courts
of Missouri were in conflict as to whether a civil action was created
by the criminal statute providing that communication of the libel
to the party libeled constitutes a publication; and in this unsettled
state of the law it concluded that the Missouri Supreme Court would
probably follow the majority rule and hold that no civil action is
created.
The court went on, however, to say that even if a cause of action
were created in Missouri it would not be enforced in Tennessee. Rely-
ing on the case of Paper Products Co. v. Doggrell,17 it declared that
the Tennessee courts would hold that a civil claim under the Mis-
souri statute is penal in character and therefore unenforceable in
Tennessee. The Doggrell case was discussed at some length in a
previous Survey,18 where it was pointed out that its definition of a
penal claim for purposes of conflict of laws is at wide variance with
the test recognized by a great majority of the courts,19 and that the
holding may possibly be unconstitutional for failure to give full faith
and credit to a statute.20 There is even less reason for treating the
claim in this case as a penal one under the majority test,21 and the
possible objection of unconstitutionality may apply here too.
15. 136 F. Supp. at 687-88.
16. 134 F. Supp. 54 (M.D. Tenn. 1955).
17. 195 Tenn. 581, 261 S.W.2d 127, 42 A.L.R.2d 651 (1953).
18. Wade, Conflict of Laws-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAND. L. REV. 755,
755-57 (1954).
19. In the leading case of Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673-74 (1892),
the test laid down is "whether its purpose is to punish an offense against
the public justice of the State, or to provide a private remedy to a person
injured by the wrongful act."
20. The case was criticized in several law reviews. See 7 VAND. L. REv.
281 (1954); 38 M=nE. L. REV. 536 (1954); 23 TENN. L. REV. 434 (1955);
40 VA. L. REv. 211 (1954).
21. While the claim arises through a criminal statute, the same may be
said of any claim involving negligence per se. Both types of claims provide
a remedy to the plaintiff for a damage he has received. Cf. Wade, Tort Lia-
bility for Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. Rzv. 63, 103-10 (1950).
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